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Professor Mark Hill QC 
 
It is unlikely – dare I say unthinkable – that twenty years ago anyone would have considered a 
paper on this topic, still less in a faraway outpost such as Newcastle on a Monday evening in 
February. 
 
Even in the United Kingdom, parts of which have the benefits and burdens of established 
churches and an overt and historic form of public religion, faith is generally considered to be a 
private matter for the individual conscience. I have written elsewhere about the historical 
development of religious freedom and the significant change recently engendered (perhaps 
unintentionally) by the Human Rights Act 1998 from passive toleration and accommodation to 
active and aggressive promotion of tightly defined rights.1 
 
Today’s lecture is intended not as a scholarly treatise on the law of religious liberty, but as a 
practical, pragmatic and mildly tendentious snapshot of the current state of play in the courts of 
England and Wales with regard to litigation religious rights. 
 
A canter through history 
The legal approach to religion and religious liberty has differed over time and across societies. 
The current human rights era marks an abrupt shift from passive religious tolerance to the 
active promotion of religious liberty as a basic right.  As such, the changes of the last decade 
need to be placed in historical context.2  Religious tolerance is a relatively recent phenomenon; 
an historical view shows that religious disadvantage and discrimination had previously been the 
common experience.3  The ousting of papal jurisdiction marked by the reformation statutes of 
the 1530s not only led to the formation of the Church of England but also resulted in religious 
intolerance. The predominance of a state church with the secular monarch as supreme governor 
led to the disadvantaging of other religions, most notably Roman Catholicism.4  This tradition 
eventually gave way to limited and piecemeal toleration.5 The law tolerated some religious 
difference but there was little evidence of a universal respect for religious liberty.  
 
The centuries following the original toleration legislation witnessed the widening of toleration 
and the introduction of some legal freedoms.  Further, the spread of toleration led to the lifting 
of legal disabilities by the positive conferring of progressive but partial rights.  However, such 
                                                 
1 Much of the legal discussion which follows is derived from M Hill, R Sandberg and N Doe, Religion and Law in the United Kingdom 
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2011); and certain passages were first published in M Hill and R Sandberg, ‘Is Nothing 
Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ (2007) Public Law 488-506.    
2  For a brief description of the historical development in England see: N. Doe, ‘National Identity, the Constitutional Tradition and the 
Structures of Law on Religion in the United Kingdom’ in Religions in European Union Law, Proceedings of the European Consortium 
of Church and State Research (1997, Luxembourg) p.107-110, and C. Hamilton, Family, Law and Religion (1996, London) chapter 1. 
For a more general overview see J. Gunn, ‘Religious Liberty (Modern Period)’ in E. Fahlbusch et al , ed,  Encyclopaedia of Christianity 
(2005, Wm B Eerdmans, Michigan) Vol. 4, pp 605-617. 
3 P. Weller, ‘Addressing Religious Difference and Islamophobia’ (2006) 17:3 Journal of Islamic Studies p.297. 
4 With the exception of the period of Mary’s reign when papal authority was restored (1553-1558) and the commonwealth period 
when dissenting protestant groups were tolerated (1648-1660). 
5 Whereby dissenters were permitted to have their own places of worship provided they gave notice to a Church of England Bishop 
and met with unlocked doors: Toleration Act 1689. 
rights did not amount to a general right to religious liberty. Rather, at common law, religious 
liberty existed as a broad and largely negative freedom rather than a positive right.6 Legal 
mechanisms generally favoured individual freedom of action: in the absence of a legal 
prohibition people were permitted to do as they wished.7  Although the parameters of religious 
freedom were deliberately kept indistinct, the common law was nevertheless able to define 
long-stop boundaries when the circumstances so demanded.  The legislature and judiciary 
adopted a stance of passive accommodation as opposed  to prescriptive regulation.   
 
This largely negative approach to religious liberty was reflected in the attitude of the law 
towards religious dress and symbols.  No general positive right to display religious symbols or 
dress was prescribed but a broad freedom existed at common law whereby individuals could 
wear what they pleased unless they were obliged to conform to a dress or uniform code at work 
or school.8 Further, this common law position was supplemented by specific statutory 
exceptions designed to lift legal disabilities.  This was most notable in relation to the Sikh 
turban.9 Sikhs alone are exempt from the requirement to wear a safety hat on a construction 
site10 and are among those exempted from the law relating to the wearing of protective 
headgear for motor cyclists.11  Such provisions owe more to the tradition of tolerance than to 
any notion of religious liberty as a widespread positive right.  
 
However, by the closing decades of the twentieth century there was some evidence of a move 
from mere toleration of religious difference to respect for religious liberty.  This shift at common 
law was equally as protracted and piecemeal as the move from intolerance to toleration.  From 
the 1950s onwards, international human rights treaties and the ideals they embodied began to 
influence the law.  That said, although judicial decisions often had regard to the spirit of these 
international obligations, they did not slavishly follow them to the letter.12 As legal debate 
focuses on the precise reach of positive legal rights, there is a risk that the spirit of the 
obligations may be obscured by the formalism of their modern articulation, which lacks the 
ambiguity and the indistinct boundaries of the common law.  Lord Denning’s famous warning 
that the European Convention on Human Rights “is drawn in such vague terms that it can be 
used for all sorts of unreasonable claims and provoke all sorts of litigation” now seems 
prophetic.13 The rigidity of international instruments poses problems for the judiciary who 
struggle to produce convincing, consistent, and coherent reasoning for their practical 
                                                 
6 As Donaldson MR noted in 1990, “the starting point of our domestic law is that every citizen has a right to do what he likes, unless 
restrained by the common law … or by statute”: AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 A.C 109.  See generally, M. Hill, ‘The 
Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United Kingdom’ (2005) 19(2) Emory International 
Law Review 1129 at p.1131-1132. 
7 See S Poulter, Asian Traditions and English Law (1990, Trentham Books) p.1. 
8 J Rivers, ‘Religious Dress: British Perspectives and OSCE Developments’ (Strasbourg Conference) Available from 
http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers.  
9 For a full account, see S. Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1998) chapter 8.  
10 Employment Act 1989, s11 provides that the requirement will not “be imposed on a Sikh … at any time when he is wearing a 
turban”. 
11 Now found in s16 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. In addition to the exemption for “any follower of the Sikh religion while he is 
wearing a turban”, a mechanism is provided for a free standing right that can be exercised by anyone once the Secretary of State has 
exempted them by Regulation. A further example is the Sikh kirpan, a small ceremonial dagger, which benefits from an exemption 
from the criminal offence of having a blade in a public place. However, the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 139 is broadly drafted and 
provides a defence if the blade is carried ‘for religious reasons’. Thus religious symbols in addition to the kirpan are protected. 
12 See, for example, Lord Denning’s judgment in Panesar v Nestle Co Ltd [1980] I.C.R. 144 (Orthodox Sikh refused job in a chocolate 
making factory since firm prohibited the wearing of beards on hygiene grounds). 
13 Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority [1978] QB 36 at p.41. 
application.14  The application of human rights principles and jurisprudence may do little to 
extend the legal protection and may on occasions offer less protection than that provided by 
domestic law.15   
 
This new focus upon positive legal rights is predicated upon adopting a different perspective on 
religious liberty. Whereas the common law historically was communitarian, taking the good of 
the society as its starting point, the recent rights-based legislation is essentially individualistic 
regarding religion as the manifestation of a personal belief.16   The common law permitted the 
holding of different beliefs, and to a lesser degree their manifestation, but not in the 
prescriptive manner as came to be articulated in human rights guarantees found in international 
instruments.  In 1978, Scarman LJ enthusiastically but unsuccessfully tried to persuade his fellow 
Court of Appeal judges to refer to international human rights in religious liberty cases on the 
basis that such cases call “not for a policy of the blind eye but for one of understanding”.17  I 
suggest that the converse has actually become true.   By examining the effect upon religious 
liberty of two areas of law (namely the Human Rights Act 1998 together with its interpretive 
regime, and the raft of anti-discrimination laws), the broad sweep of liberal tolerance and the 
subtlety and nuance previously found at common law has become lost in the detail of the 
regulation which brings with it the intellectual dishonesty of the blind eye. 
 
The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 
The Human Rights Act 1998 has brought about something of a legal revolution.18 The House of 
Lords has now conclusively determined that a parochial church council of the (established) 
Church of England is not a core “public authority” for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 
1998.19  Further, there has traditionally been a general reluctance to interfere with the 
regulation of religious bodies as identified in the Strasbourg jurisprudence and in the domestic 
courts.20   This has been furthered by section 13 of the Act which provides that if a court’s 
determination of any question arising under the Act might affect the exercise by a religious 
organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, then the court must have particular regard to the importance of that 
                                                 
14 See, for example, the comments of Mummery LJ in Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932; [2005] ICR 1789 at para 
35 where he noted that Strasbourg principles are simply “repeated assertions unsupported by the evidence or reasoning that would 
normally accompany a judicial ruling”, which “are difficult to square with the supposed fundamental character of the rights” and are 
inconsistently applied.  In the same decision, Rix LJ suggested that Convention jurisprudence actually runs counter to the very needs 
for which a concern for human rights are supposed to exist (para 60).  
15 In Copsey, Neuberger LJ focussed entirely upon the domestic law of unfair dismissal claiming it to be the “proper analysis” on the 
grounds that reliance on Convention rights would not protect the claimant “as far as his reliance on the effect of domestic law” 
could: paras 77, 81 and 90-91.  Lord Bingham of Cornhill made clear in R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 
AC 323, para 20, that domestic law may provide for rights more generous than those granted by the ECHR, provided that they do not 
seek to do so by reference to its provisions. 
16 This theme is well expressed in Locke’s Second Treatise on Government. See J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (ed) M Goldie 
(Dent, London, 1993) and the discussion in the context of religious liberty to be found in R Ruston, Human Rights and the Image of 
God, (SCM Press, London , 2004) ch 14 pp. 236-250. See also CB Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1962) p. 221. 
17 He added that, “The system must be made sufficiently flexible to accommodate their beliefs and their observances”: Ahmad v 
Inner London Education Authority [1978] Q.B. 36 at p.48. 
18 See M Hill, ed, Religious Liberty and Human Rights (2002, University of Wales Press, Cardiff). Under section 3,  courts are required 
to interpret United Kingdom legislation so far as is possible in a manner compatible with the rights outlined in the ECHR.  
19 See Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C 546. Through extension by analogy, this 
seminal case will have a significant effect on other component institutions of the Church of England. The House of Lords expressly 
rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeal which had held that the Church of England being an established church automatically 
rendered its component bodies public authorities.  See the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, The 
Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act (February 2004), HL Paper 39, HC 382.  
20 See M Hill, ‘Judicial Approaches to Religious Disputes’ in R O’Dair and A Lewis (eds), Law and Religion, Current Legal Issues IV 
(2001, Oxford University Press) pp 409-420. 
right.21   Whilst section 13 might give presumptive priority to religious freedom,22 it does not 
allow religious freedom to trump other rights such as Article 6.23  Commentators seem divided 
as to the significance of the section.24 
 
Irrespective of the questionable buttressing of section 13 of the Human Rights Act, Article 9 of 
the ECHR is now directly justiciable in domestic courts. It provides: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is absolute. This includes the right to 
hold a religion or belief and to change it and the right not to allow the State to determine 
whether one’s religion or belief is legitimate.25  In contrast, the right to manifest one’s religion 
or belief is qualified by Article 9(1) in that the manifestation must be “in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance” and by the permissible limitations in Article 9(2) which allow the State 
to interfere with the right if: (a) the interference is “prescribed by law” in that it has some basis 
in domestic law, is accessible and its effects foreseeable;26 (b)  meets one of the legitimate aims 
outlined in the article;27 and (c) is “necessary in a democratic society” in that the interference  
corresponds to a pressing social need and  is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.28   
 
The ECHR, however, was not a dead letter prior to 1998 but a treaty obligation with status in 
international law.29  As such, although it was not part of domestic law, Articles of the 
                                                 
21 See P. Cumper, ‘The Protection of Religious Rights under Section 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998 [2000] Public Law p.265. Note 
also the ironic observation of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead that were component institutions of the Church of England to be classified 
as public authorities, they would, by definition, lose their status of victim and with it any right of action in respect of a violation of 
Convention rights, including that of freedom of religion: see Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, 
[2004] 1 A.C. 546 at para 15. 
22 See by analogy cases concerning the parallel provisions in s 12 concerning the importance to be afforded to the Convention right 
to freedom of expression: Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] Q.B 967, per Sedley LJ;  Lakeside Homes Limited v BBC [2000] W.L 1841602, 
per Creswell J.  
23The Queen on the Application of Ullah v Special Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 1584 (Admin) per Harrision J. 
24 For Rivers the provision increases the “interpretative discretion” of the judiciary while Cumper regards it merely a symbolic 
political statement designed to placate religious opponents: see J. Rivers, ‘Religious Liberty as a Collective Right’ in R O’Dair and A 
Lewis (eds), Law and Religion, Current Legal Issues IV (2001, Oxford University Press)  p 246; J Rivers, ‘From Toleration to Pluralism: 
Religious Liberty and Religious Establishment under the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act’ in R Ahdar, (ed) Law and Religion 
(2000, Ashgate) p.138 and Cumper, n.27 above, p.265.  Other writers have also downplayed the significance of s13. See, for 
example, J Wadham, and H Mountfield, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (1998, London) p 55.)  Hill concludes that it 
is “at best an articulation and codification of the *pre-Human Rights Act] position” (Hill, above p 419) while Sedley has contended 
extra-judicially that section 13(1) of the Act serves simply “to reassure congregations that they are on the individual, not the state, 
side of the Convention” (Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘Preface’ in M Hill, above).   Ahdar and Leigh seem to describe the consensus when they 
call  the provision “rather mild”. (Ahdar and Leigh, above, p 359). 
25 Manoussakis v Greece (1997) 23 EHRR 387; Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (2002) 35 EHRR 306. 
26 Sahin v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Grand Chamber decision). 
27 Namely “public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”. 
28 Serif v Greece (2001) 31 E.H.R.R 20. See R Sandberg, ‘Human Rights and Human Remains: The Impact of Dödsbo v Sweden’ (2006) 
8 Ecclesiastical Law Journal p.453-457.  
29 P v DDP ex p Kebeline [2000] 2 A.C 326, see the judgment of Laws LJ. 
Convention, including Article 9, were regarded as “an aid to interpretation” and English courts 
sought to ensure that their decisions conformed to the ECHR.30  The short title of the Human 
Rights Act is that it is “an Act to give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
the European Convention on Human Rights”.31  That said, much of this “further effect” has been 
novel and influential: for example, the expression “religion or belief” as used in Article 9 has 
become a standard phrase both in political discourse and legislation.32  Much more importance 
is now placed by domestic courts on the Strasbourg jurisprudence,33 although it is not slavishly 
followed as the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd makes plain.34  
 
 
Aston Cantlow 
A lay rector who owns land to which the obligation applies, is required to keep the chancel of 
the parish concerned in good repair. This common law liability existed long before the 
Reformation and its enforcement was a matter for the ecclesiastical courts. However, following 
the Chancel Repairs Act 1932, a procedure was introduced whereby the secular courts enforce 
the liability by way of an action for a sum of money representing the cost of repair. 
 
The PCC of Aston Cantlow sought to recover from the lay rector the cost of repair to the 
chancel. The lay rector conceded the existence of the common law obligation of which it had full  
knowledge at the time the land was acquired but argued that the enforcement of the obligation 
was in breach of the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
The House of Lords considered this area of property law arcane and unsatisfactory, stating that 
the very language was redolent of a society long disappeared. However the importance of the 
decision for the Church of England lies not in provisions of the Chancel Repairs Act but rather in 
the discussion of the nature of Church itself and its place in society and government. 
 
In order for Convention rights to come into play, the court must first be satisfied that the alleged 
wrongdoer is a 'public authority' for the purposes of the Act. The Court of Appeal had found that 
the PCC was such an authority, basing its assessment principally upon the fact the Church of 
England is an established church. The five Law Lords unanimously rejected both its reasoning 
and conclusion.  
Historically the Church of England has discharged an important and influential role in 
the life of this country. As the established church it still has special links with central 
government. But the Church of England remains essentially a religious organization. This 
is so even though some of the emanations of the church discharge functions which may 
qualify as governmental. Church schools and the conduct of marriage services are two 
instances. The legislative powers of the General Synod of the Church of England are 
                                                 
30 Ahmad v ILEA [1977] 1 Q.B 36. 
31 Emphasis added. 
32 For example, note the use of the phrase in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.  
33 As required by section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
34 [2005] EWCA Civ 932; [2005] ICR 1789.  In the case, concerning the application of Article 9 to employment law, Rix LJ pointed out 
that English Courts need not follow the Strasbourg case law on this topic since it is does not constitute a “clear and constant 
jurisprudence” (see para 66).  Neuberger LJ noted that there was “no reason, either on the authorities or in principle, how or why 
Article 9 of the Convention” should be applied since “Article 9 does not even get Mr  Copsey as far as his reliance on the effect of 
domestic law” (para 91).  See, generally, G Watson, ‘Sunday Working and Human Rights: A Critique of Copsey v Devon Clays’ (2006) 8 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal pp 333-335. 
another. This should not be regarded as infecting the Church of England as a whole, or 
its emanations in general, with the character of a governmental organization.35 
 
Lord Hope of Craighead recognised that the Church of England as a whole has no legal status or 
personality, but that its relationship with the state is one of recognition, not the devolution to it 
of any of the powers or functions of government. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry stated that 'the 
juridical nature of the Church is, notoriously, somewhat amorphous' but considered that the 
mission of the Church is a religious mission, distinct from the secular mission of the government, 
whether central or local. The ties with the state are intended to accomplish the Church's own 
mission, not the aims and objectives of government. He concluded that the PCC exists to carry 
forward the Church's mission at the local level. 
 
Were it to be otherwise, and the component institutions of the Church of England classified as 
'public authorities', then, by virtue of the way the Human Rights Act is drafted, those institutions 
would lose the status of 'victim'. This would prevent them from complaining of any violation of 
Convention rights, including that of freedom of religion. This would have been an extraordinary 
conclusion since, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead pointed out, the Act goes out of its way in 
section 13 to single out for express mention the exercise by religious organisations of the 
Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.         
 
Not being classified a ‘public authority’, the Church of England remains free to engage in its 
mission and witness. In doing so it is on an equal footing with all other denominations and faith 
communities in the United Kingdom. It may well be that at some future date chancel repair 
liability will be revisited but in a dignified and systematic way providing compensation for 
parishes in the process. The House of Lords has ensured that lay rectors cannot avail themselves 
of the Human Rights Act to evade a clear legal liability and achieve a windfall increase in the 
value of their property.  
 
 
Religious dress 
Article 9 provides a positive right to both the freedom of thought, conscience and religion and 
the manifestation of that religion or belief. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is absolute. In contrast, the right to manifest one’s religion or belief is limited by Article 
9(1) in that the manifestation must be ‘in worship, teaching, practice and observance’ and, more 
importantly, by the qualifications in Article 9(2) which permit the state to interfere with the 
right if three tests in Article 9(2) are met: the interference must be ‘prescribed by law’, have one 
or more of the legitimate aims listed and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Litigants need 
to show that there has been an interference with the manifestation of their religion or belief 
under Article 9(1), and the onus then falls on the State to show that this interference was 
justified under Article 9(2). 
 
(i) Interference under Article 9(1) 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg generally takes a formulaic approach to 
Article 9 cases. The Court invariably begins by stressing the importance of the right, citing the 
leading case, Kokkinakis v Greece,36 which described how ‘freedom of thought, conscience and 
                                                 
35 Per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at paragraph 13. 
36 (1994) 17 EHRR 397. 
religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the 
Convention’.37 The Court then asks whether there has been an interference with Article 9(1) and 
if there has been, whether that interference is justified under Article 9(2). The question of 
whether there has been an interference is often a formality: it is sometimes expressed as asking 
whether Article 9 has been engaged. Strasbourg has employed three ‘filtering devices’ to 
exclude claims under the question of interference: the definition of belief, the 
manifestation/motivation requirement and the specific situation rule.38 
 
(a) Definition of Belief39 
The European Court of Human Rights has taken a liberal approach to the definition of religion. 
Strasbourg institutions have considered claims concerning scientology,40 druidism,41 pacifism,42 
communism,43 atheism,44 pro-life,45 Divine Light Zentrum,46 the Moon Sect,47 as well as ‘splinter’ 
groups within larger traditions,48 and have invariably done so without questioning whether the 
objects of such claims are protected.49 Strasbourg case law tends to revolve around the 
definition of ‘belief’, rather than the definition of ‘religion’. The term ‘belief’ is considered in 
Strasbourg jurisprudence to require a worldview rather than a mere opinion.50 However, 
Strasbourg has only been prepared to use the belief filter in exceptional cases. 
 
The Strasbourg approach has been replicated at the domestic level. In the House of Lords 
decision of R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte 
Williamson,51 Lord Nicholls noted that the protection of ‘religion or belief’ meant that the 
question of ‘deciding whether a belief is to be characterised as religious … will seldom, if ever, 
arise under the European Convention’ because it does not matter whether the belief is religious 
or non-religious.52 Moreover, Lord Nicholls noted that ‘freedom of religion protects the 
subjective belief of an individual’.53 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, in particular, doubted 
                                                 
37 The Kokkinakis justification is twofold, stressing both the social and personal functions of religion. The European Court of Human 
Rights permits a ‘margin of appreciation’ allowing States to differ from each other in relation to their laws and policies to some 
extent to allow for their different cultures. While previously Strasbourg has spoken of the existence of a wide margin of appreciation 
in the sphere of morals and religion (especially in relation to attacks on religious convictions), recent decisions suggest a degree of 
inconsistency in the deference which the Strasbourg Court will afford to national legislatures on matters of religion: see Sahin v 
Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 8 and Lautsi v Italy [2009] ECtHR (Application No. 30814/06), where the decision of the Grand Chamber is 
awaited at the time of writing. 
38 R Sandberg, ‘The Changing Position of Religious Minorities in English Law: The Legacy of Begum’, in R Grillo et al (ed), Legal 
Practice and Cultural Diversity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 267–282. 
39 See R Sandberg, ‘Defining Religion: Towards An Interdisciplinary Approach’, Revista General de Derecho Canonico y Derecho 
Eclesiâstico del Estado 17 (2008): 1–23. 
40 X and Church of Scientology v Sweden (1978) 16 DR 68. 
41 Chappell v United Kingdom (1987) 53 DR 241. Although the existence of Druidism as a religion was questioned, the case was 
decided purely on the grounds that State restrictions on the celebration of the summer solstice at Stonehenge were justified under 
Article 9(2). 
42 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978) 19 DR 5. 
43 Hazar, Hazar and Acik v Turkey (1991) 72 DR 200. 
44 Angeleni v Sweden (1986) 51 DR 41. 
45 Plattform ‘Ärtze für das Leben’ v Austria (1985) 44 DR 65. 
46 Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum v Switzerland (1981) 25 DR 105. 
47 X v Austria (1981) 26 DR 89. 
48 For example, Serif v Greece (1999) 31 EHRR 561 (Mufti elected by Mosque congregations in opposition to the Mufti appointed by 
the Government). 
49 R Ahdar & I Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 124; PM Taylor, Freedom of 
Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 207. 
50 It was defined in Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom, (1982) 4 EHRR 293 as denoting ‘views that attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ (para 36). 
51 [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246. 
52 Paragraph 24. 
53 Paragraph 22. 
whether it was right for courts, except in extreme cases, ‘to impose an evaluative filter’ at the 
stage of identifying whether there was a belief, ‘especially when religious beliefs are involved’.54 
Generally, however, United Kingdom domestic courts have not relied upon the definition of 
belief as a filter in their interpretation of Article 9.55  
 
(b) The Manifestation or Motivation Requirement 
The second filter used in relation to Article 9(1) is the manifestation/motivation requirement, 
which requires that the claimant’s actions actually express his or her religion or belief and area a 
manifestation of that religion or belief as opposed to being merely motivated by it.56 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that this filter is not always employed by the court.57 At Strasbourg, the 
test has often been rephrased as requiring, for example, that the action is ‘intimately linked’ to 
the claimant’s religion or belief,58 or whether the actions ‘give expression’ to his religion or 
belief.59 
 
In R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson,60 
although Lord Nicholls did note the motivation requirement, stating that ‘Article 9 does not “in 
all cases” guarantee the right to behave in public in a way “dictated by a belief”’,61 he held that 
this should not exclude the claim. He further noted that if ‘the belief takes the form of a 
perceived obligation to act in a specific way, then, in principle, doing that act pursuant to that 
belief is itself a manifestation of that belief in practice’ and that ‘in such cases the act is 
‘intimately linked’ to the belief’.62 However, he added this did not mean ‘that a perceived 
obligation is a prerequisite to manifestation of a belief in practice’.63 That a belief was obligatory 
was simply good evidence that the exercise of that belief was manifestation protected by Article 
9; it was not the case that a belief had to be obligatory to be protected by Article 9. 
 
(c) The Specific Situation Rule 
The third ‘filtering device’ may be styled the specific situation rule. It recognises that a person’s 
Article 9 rights may be influenced by the particular situation of the individual claiming that 
freedom. This principle is not of universal application: it only applies where a person voluntarily 
submitted to a particular system of rules. Strasbourg has recognised that the application of this 
rule in specific situations such as in relation to detainees,64 non-compulsory military service,65 
                                                 
54 Paragraph 57. 
55 This is shown by two cases concerning religious drug use. In R v Taylor [2001] EWCA Crim 2263 and R v Andrews [2004] EWCA Crim 
947, cases concerning the  possession and importing of cannabis by Rastafarians, the Court of Appeal held that drug prohibition laws 
could be justified under Article 9(2). It was assumed without comment that Rastafarianism was a religion and that drug-taking was 
capable being a manifestation of that religion under Article 9(1). 
56 Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 218. This rule has been criticised on the basis that the presence or absence of 
religious motivation may actually serve as a good indicator of whether a belief should be protected and that a rigid adherence to the 
manifestation requirement ‘would seem to discriminate against religions without an established cultural base in European States’ 
whose devotions ‘take different forms, such as sexual intercourse, ritual violence, or refusal to pay taxes to a centralised state 
hostile to their beliefs’. See PW Edge, ‘Current Problems in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ Juridical Review 
(1996): 42 at 45–47. 
57 S Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities and the Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 44; R. Sandberg, ‘The Changing 
Position of Religious Minorities in English Law: The Legacy of Begum’, in R Grillo et al (ed) Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). 
58 C v UK (1983) 37 DR 142, 144; Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (2002) 34 EHRR 55. 
59 Knudsen v. Norway (1985) 42 DR 247. 
60 [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246. 
61 Paragraph 30. 
62 At paras 32–33. 
63 At paras 32–33. 
64 X v United Kingdom (1974) 1 D& R at 41-42. 
65 Kalaç v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 552. 
employment,66 and enrolment at university.67 However, in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are 
Shalom Ve Tsedek v France68 Strasbourg seemed to go further by imposing an ‘impossibility 
test’: the Court commented that an ‘alternative means of accommodating religious beliefs had 
... to be “impossible” before a claim of interference under Article 9 could succeed.’ This broader 
approach has not been consistently followed in subsequent Strasbourg cases and in Sahin v 
Turkey,69 concerning a university regulation banning a student from wearing a headscarf at 
enrolment, lectures and examinations, although the specific situation rule was referred to by 
the Court,70 the Court proceeded ‘on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed 
restrictions of place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, 
constituted an interference with the applicant's right to manifest her religion’.71 
 
The early decisions of United Kingdom domestic courts recognised the specific situation rule but 
echoed the later Strasbourg jurisprudence in noting its limited scope and refrained from 
enthusiastically applying the rule.72 The House of Lords’ decision in Williamson also recognised 
the existence of the specific situation rule, but did not apply it to the facts of the case. As Lord 
Nicholls noted, ‘What constitutes interference depends on all the circumstances of the case, 
including the extent to which in the circumstances an individual can reasonably expect to be at 
liberty to manifest his beliefs in practice’, meaning that an individual ‘may need to take his 
specific situation into account’.73 
 
(ii) Justification Under Article 9(2)  
In Strasbourg jurisprudence the focus invariably shifts from the question of interference under 
Article 9(1) to the Article 9(2) qualifications, which are used to determine whether the 
interference by the State was justified. The same is also true of domestic decisions, though for 
the reasons discussed above, in most cases the consideration of Article 9(2) by a domestic court 
is often obiter, the court having rejected the claim on the question of interference under Article 
9(1). Nevertheless the vast majority of decisions address the three tests laid out in Article 9(2) 
applying them one by one: to be justified the interference must be ‘prescribed by law’, have a 
‘legitimate aim’ and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
 
(a) Prescribed by Law 
This first test requires that the interference must have some basis in domestic law. This test has 
not proved problematic for the domestic judiciary: for instance, the House of Lords has held that 
both a rule ‘prescribed by primary legislation in clear terms’74 and a school uniform policy75 
were, respectively, prescribed by law. In relation to the latter, emphasis was given to the fact 
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72 This was epitomised by the Court of Appeal decision in Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932.concerning an 
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that schools and their governors were permitted under statutory authority to make rules on 
uniform and those rules had been very clearly communicated to those affected by them.76 
 
(b) Legitimate Aim 
The second test is that the interference fulfils one of the aims listed in Article 9(2). These 
overlap substantially.77 At Strasbourg, this requirement is often a formality: Taylor has noted 
that the margin of appreciation adopted by European institutions means that they ‘tend to 
accept rather than challenge the aim claimed by the State, and accordingly pass over this 
precondition with little detailed analysis’.78 The same appears to be true at a domestic level. 
Although in most cases the legitimate aim is protecting the rights and freedoms of others,79 
referring to the Convention rights of others, a wide range of legitimate aims have been cited by 
courts.80 
 
(c) Necessary in a Democratic Society 
The third test has been the subject of clarification by Strasbourg. It is understood that the 
requirement that the interference be necessary in a democratic society requires two tests to be 
met: the interference must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and it must be ‘proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued’.81 This requires a ‘balancing exercise’ whereby the court asks 
‘whether the interference with the right is more extensive than is justified by the legitimate 
aim’.82 Since ‘the notion of proportionality will always contain some subjective element and 
depend significantly on the context’,83 it is not surprising that different judges have taken 
differing approaches to this test. 
 
Discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention Rights 
The enjoyment of all Convention rights is subject to Article 14. While Article 9 may be said to be 
concerned with positive religious freedom (the liberty to believe and manifest one’s belief), 
Article 14 is concerned with negative religious freedom (the liberty from discrimination on the 
grounds of belief).84 Article 14 forbids discrimination on, inter alia, grounds of religion but only 
does so in regard to ‘the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention’. Article 1 of Protocol 
12 extends this to ‘any right set forth by law’ but this has not been ratified in the United 
Kingdom. This does not mean that a ‘violation of a substantive Article need to be established at 
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all in cases involving discrimination’ under Article 14.85 Strasbourg has confirmed that ‘a 
measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements of the Article enshrining the right 
or freedom in question may however infringe this Article when read in conjunction with Article 
14 for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature’,86 that is, if the distinction has no objective 
and reasonable justification.87 Other Articles will often interact with Article 9; for instance, 
where freedom of expression clashes with freedom of religion. Strasbourg has held that the 
freedom to manifest religion does not include a right to be exempt from all criticism88 and 
freedom of expression contains ‘a duty to avoid expressions that are gratuitously offensive to 
others and profane’.89 
 
Although the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in some respects 
may be suspect, the United Kingdom domestic courts are nevertheless under a statutory duty to 
take it into account.90 In the cases concerning religious liberty heard in England since the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act, some judgments have been delivered without reference to 
Article 9 or to freedom of religion at all.91 In other cases, detailed reference to and the 
application of the Article 9 rights have reinforced the common law position, not necessarily 
changing the outcome of the case but augmenting and, on occasion, improving the reasoning 
upon which the decision was made.92 Recent cases on the use of drugs for a religious purpose 
are a clear example of this: the Human Rights Act 1998 has allowed judges to use the limitations 
under Article 9(2) as the process by which to determine the matter.93 This seems preferable to 
the approach used by the American District Court which excluded a similar claim by relying 
instead upon a restrictive definition of religion as a filtering device.94 The English interpretation 
of the Article 9 right and its limitations seems more satisfactory than the American approach 
which effectively assesses the legitimacy of a religious belief and crudely manipulates its 
definition of religion.  
 
Religious dress 
In common with many civic freedoms, the legal regulation of religious matters has been affected 
by the Human Rights Act. No longer are restrictions on religious symbols and religious dress 
merely governed by Wednesbury unreasonableness,95 as Poulter had previously suggested.96 
There are now be an alternative cause of action under Article 9 itself. As already discussed, the 
European Court of Human Rights has determined that wearing religious dress or displaying 
religious symbols is a manifestation of one’s religion or belief and is thus protected by Article 
9(1), but it has consistently upheld limitations upon the exercise of the right. In Dahlab v 
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Switzerland,97 the Court held that a ban preventing a teacher of small children from wearing her 
headscarf at school was justified as it had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others, public order and public safety and there was a pressing social need given 
the impact that the ‘powerful external symbol’ conveyed by her wearing a headscarf could have 
upon young children and by the possible proselytising effect.  In Sahin v Turkey,98 the court held 
that a university regulation banning a student from wearing a headscarf at enrolment, lectures 
and examinations was justified as being prescribed by law, having the legitimate aim of 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order and being necessary 
in a democratic society.99 
 
The jilbab 
The most substantive discussion of the law affecting religious dress for school pupils is to be 
found in the decision of R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School,100 both at first instance and in two subsequent appeals. Shabina Begum, a 
Muslim, stopped attending Denbigh High School when the school refused to allow her to wear 
the jilbab,101 which she described as the only garment that met her religious requirements since 
it concealed the contours of the female body, including the shape of her arms and legs.102  At 
first instance,103 Bennett J gave little prominence to Begum’s alleged Article 9 right to manifest 
her religion by wearing the jilbab. He held that although her refusal to respect the school 
uniform policy was ‘motivated by religious beliefs’, there had been no interference with her 
Article 9(1) right since even if Begum had been excluded (which he held she was not) she would 
have been ‘excluded for her refusal to abide by the school uniform policy rather than her beliefs 
as such’.104  This approach was not in conformity with Strasbourg jurisprudence. The bold 
assertion that insistence on wearing religious dress does not constitute a manifestation of one’s 
religion or belief is wrong. 
  
The subsequent Court of Appeal judgment, which reversed the decision of Bennett J, was 
subject to much academic criticism.105 The flaw was not the treatment of Article 9(1), which was 
undoubtedly correct, but rather the application of Article 9(2). The Court of Appeal followed 
Strasbourg jurisprudence to hold that Article 9(1) was engaged but, as Poole has pointed out, in 
deciding that the limitation of the right was justified under Article 9(2) Brooke LJ’s interpretation 
of the Strasbourg jurisprudence was predicated upon a basic mistake.106 Rather than deciding 
whether the limitation could be justified as being necessary in a democratic society, he outlined 
the decision-making structure and process which the school should have used since, on his 
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findings, the onus lay on the school to justify its interference with the Convention right.107  This 
is a legally unsupportable approach. Whilst courts adopt a procedural analysis in the 
Administrative Court when subjecting the decisions of public authorities to judicial review, there 
is nothing in the Human Rights Act, the ECHR or Convention jurisprudence from Strasbourg 
requiring public authorities themselves to adopt a proportionality approach to the structuring of 
their own decision-making.108    
 
The further appeal to the House of Lords (now reconstituted as the United Kingdom’s Supreme 
Court) led to a decision109 which was welcomed in that it corrected the Court of Appeal’s overly 
formulaic approach to Article 9(2), and held, correctly in my view, that there was no breach of 
Article 9. However, the majority of their Lordships repeated and compounded the error 
originally made by Bennett J in relation to Article 9(1).  Lords Bingham of Cornhill, Hoffmann and 
Scott of Foscote properly held that there had been no interference with Begum’s rights under 
Article 9(1) but their confused, and not always consistent, understanding of Convention case law 
evidences defective reasoning: Lord Scott even spoke of an Article 9(2) right to manifest one’s 
religion.110 Their Lordships applied the ‘specific situation’ rule as if it were of general effect.111 
Lord Bingham correctly elucidated the rule but proceeded to apply it to the facts of the Begum 
case without explanation. He quoted selectively from numerous Strasbourg and domestic cases 
which had addressed the rule but omitted to mention references to the specific limits to its 
scope and extent.  No reason was given why the ‘specific situation’ rule ought to be applied to 
school pupils. Lord Bingham seemed to think that the application of Strasbourg case law to 
university students was justification enough, but this is to ignore the fact that unlike a university 
student, a school pupil has not voluntarily accepted an employment or role which might 
legitimately limit his Article 9 rights.  In state schools there is no contractual relationship 
between school and pupil, and not infrequently little choice as to the school which a child must 
attend. 
 
The reasoning in the opinions of Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale (differing from the other three Law 
Lords but concurring in the ultimate disposal of the appeal) is correct in law and more consistent 
with Strasbourg jurisprudence in that they both recognised that Begum’s right under Article 9 
had been engaged but that this was justified under Article 9(2).  Lord Nicholls noted that he 
would prefer to state that there was interference with Article 9 and then to consider whether 
that interference was justified since this would require the public authority to ‘explain and 
justify its decision’.112 However, his Lordship did not find it necessary fully to elucidate this 
approach, which, had it been adopted by the whole House, would have produced a fuller and 
more satisfactory analysis.113 The restriction of Article 9(1) by the majority was unnecessary 
given that legitimate limitations on the right are routinely justified under Article 9(2).   
 
Although the ultimate disposal of the case in the House of Lords was undoubtedly correct, 
restoring as it did the dismissal of the claim by Bennett J, the reasoning is not entirely 
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satisfactory, in common with many of the early cases brought to the appellate courts in the 
altered legal landscape of the Human Rights Act 1998. Lord Bingham stated that: 
The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the 
right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has 
voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice 
or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or observe his 
or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience.114 
He concluded that the Strasbourg case law indicated that ‘interference is not easily 
established’115 before applying the ‘specific situation’ rule to the case without explanation. 
  
The House of Lords conceptualised the question largely in terms of proportionality, giving scant 
attention to identifying a pressing social need.116 Lady Hale concluded that the school’s uniform 
policy was a thoughtful and proportionate response to reconciling the complexities of the 
situation. This is demonstrated by the fact that girls have subsequently expressed their concern 
that if the jilbab were to be allowed they would face pressure to adopt it even though they 
might not wish to do so.117 The analysis of the House of Lords would have been far more 
satisfactory had it adopted the classic Strasbourg approach, without recourse to the ‘specific 
situation’ rule: 
i. was the wearing of the jilbab a manifestation of the applicant’s religion? - yes 
ii. was its prohibition an interference? – yes 
iii. could the prohibition be justified? - yes   
 
 
The niqab 
In R (on the application of X) v Y School,118 Silber J considered the Begum precedent to be ‘an 
insuperable barrier’ to a claim for judicial review by a schoolgirl who wished to wear a niqab veil 
while she was being taught by male teachers at school or was likely to be seen by men. The 
claimant, a 12 year old Muslim girl, refused to attend school on the basis that the school would 
not permit her to wear a niqab veil, which covered her entire face save her eyes.  Silber J held 
that there had been no interference with the claimant’s Article 9 rights and, even if there had 
been, it would have been justified under Article 9(2). He implicitly accepted Lord Bingham’s 
assertion in Begum that the ‘specific situation’ rule applied in the case of schools.  Further, 
unlike Lord Bingham, Silber J stated that there would be no interference with the Article 9 right 
simply because ‘there are other means open to practise or observe *one’s+ religion without 
undue hardship or inconvenience’.119  
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Silber J four reasons for dismissing the claim, in my assessment, are based upon a questionable 
reading of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and fail to explain why the ‘specific situation’ rule 
should be given general effect. His first reason amounted to nothing more than a recitation of 
Lord Scott’s proposition in Begum that there is no infringement of the right to manifest ‘where 
other public institutions offering similar services’ are available.  Similarly, the second reason was 
a quotation of Lord Hoffmann’s assertion in Begum that ‘Article 9 does not require that one 
should be allowed to manifest one’s religion at any time and place of one’s choosing’. The third, 
derived from Strasbourg jurisprudence, was that ‘the Strasbourg case law shows that there is no 
interference with an Article 9 right where there is an alternative place at which the services in 
question can be provided without the objectionable rule in question’.120 And the fourth reason 
was that Strasbourg had imposed ‘a high threshold before interference can be established’.121 
Quoting Lord Bingham, Silber J found no interference with the claimant’s rights under Article 9 
and interpreted Lord Bingham’s elucidation of the specific situation rule in Begum as meaning 
that there would be no interference whenever a person had voluntarily accepted an 
employment or role that does not accommodate that practice or observance or where there are 
other means open to practise or observe that religion without undue hardship or inconvenience. 
In other words, since it was open to the girl to move to another school (as was the case in 
Begum) where she would be permitted to wear the garment in question, there was no 
interference in the manifestation of her religion. 
 
The weakness of the approach of English law post-Begum was underlined by Silber J’s comments 
commending the school on having in place a well-thought out policy. Ironically, the approach 
now taken by English law makes the quality of the policy irrelevant. Provided that the right to 
manifest can be exercised elsewhere, it seems that the court will be entitled, or even obliged, to 
find that there had been no interference. Surely the better approach would have been to 
require schools to provide a balanced policy, judged against the factors enumerated in Article 
9(2). In his admirable treatment of Article 9(2), Silber J unwittingly showed the inadequacy of 
the approach now taken by English courts applying the reasoning in Begum. By giving general 
effect to a filtering device which had hitherto been used only by the European Court of Human 
Rights in a limited class of specific cases, and, in consequence, closing down the reach of Article 
9(1), the domestic courts are applying too broad an approach.122  This seems contrary both to 
the spirit of the ECHR as previously interpreted by the House of Lords in Williamson123 and by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.124 This is particularly concerning given that 
Strasbourg has started to take a less restricted approach.  Collins notes that recent years have 
witnessed a ‘profound reorientation’ in interpretation towards an ‘integrated approach’ which 
‘involves an interpretation of Convention rights with reference to the rights contained in social 
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and economic charters’.125  This wider mechanism as employed by the European Court of 
Human Rights contrasts sharply with the increasingly narrow approach taken by English courts.  
 
The purity ring 
In R (on the Application of Playfoot (A Child)) v Millais School Governing Body,126 an application 
for judicial review of a decision by a school to prevent a schoolgirl from wearing a ‘purity’ ring 
on grounds of Articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR was refused by the High Court on the question of 
interference. The judge held that Article 9 was not engaged since, although the claimant held a 
‘religious belief’, in that she had made a decision to remain a virgin until marriage because she 
was a Christian, the wearing of the ring was not ‘intimately linked’ to the belief in chastity 
before marriage because Playfoot was under no obligation, by reason of her faith, to wear the 
ring. The judge correctly cited Lord Nicholls in Williamson as stating that if ‘the belief takes the 
form of a perceived obligation to act in a specific way, then, in principle, doing that act pursuant 
to that belief is itself a manifestation of that belief in practice’ but incorrectly said that this 
meant that the reverse was also true: if there was no such obligation then the act cannot be a 
manifestation of that belief.127 The judge further commented that even if he had found that the 
purity ring was a manifestation of religion then, there would have been no interference with 
Article 9 since the claimant had voluntarily accepted the school’s uniform policy and there were 
other means open to her to practise her belief without undue hardship or inconvenience. Thus 
he relied upon the slightly crude ‘specific situation’ rule rather that a more nuanced analysis of 
the Article 9 formulaic approach. 
 
The Sikh Kara bracelet 
In R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High 
School,128 a school girl who was an observant though non-initiated Sikh sought to wear her Kara 
bracelet to school. Silber J heard expert evidence that although the Kara was often worn it was 
only compulsory in the case of initiated Sikhs. Silber J stated that disadvantage would occur – 
but would not only occur – where a pupil is forbidden from wearing an item where ‘that person 
genuinely believed for reasonable grounds that wearing this item was a matter of exceptional 
importance to his or her racial identity or his or her religious belief’ and where ‘the wearing of 
the item can be shown objectively to be of exceptional importance to his or her religion or race, 
even if the wearing of the article is not an actual requirement of that person’s religion or 
race’.129 This approach, though related to religious discrimination law, is in line with the most 
recent Strasbourg jurisprudence on the manifestation/motivation requirement discussed above. 
According to some commentators,130 the success of the claim in Watkins-Singh) means that 
litigants are now best advised not to pursue claims under Article 9 but to invoke the detailed 
anti-discrimination provisions under the Equality Act and secondary legislation made 
thereunder.131 
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Chastisement of children 
On 24 February 2005 the House of Lords delivered a significant judgment on freedom of religion, 
parental rights to religious freedom, corporal punishment and children’s rights: R (Williamson) v 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment132 which demonstrates that the House of Lords 
adopts a much more generous approach to freedom of religion or belief than the European 
Court of Human Rights.133 
 
The abolition of corporal punishment at schools in England and Wales developed from the 
Education (No 2) Act 1986,134 to section 548 of the Education Act 1996,135 (as extended by 
section 131 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998).136 In parallel, the law has 
redefined reasonable chastisement, from the Education Act 1993,137 to the Children Act 2004.138 
Accordingly, to be lawful, corporal punishment administered by a parent must now stop short of 
causing actual bodily harm. 
 
The Court of Appeal had decided the case on narrow Article 9(1) grounds. It had held that 
section 548 did prevent the delegation by parents to teachers of the parental right to administer 
reasonable physical chastisement. The judges disagreed whether corporal punishment in this 
context was a manifestation of religion or belief under Article 9(1). However, they all agreed 
that section 548 did not constitute an interference with freedom of religion, as it was possible 
for the applicants lawfully to manifest their belief in corporal punishment by alternative means. 
Accordingly, there was no breach of Article 9 or the Protocol. 
 
The House of Lords rejected the further appeal, but took a more generous approach to freedom 
of religion and belief and closely followed the structure of Article 9. Under Article 9(1), the 
applicants’ beliefs were engaged and they were manifesting their religion. Section 548 
constituted an interference with the manifestation of their beliefs but one which was justified 
under Article 9(2). 
 
The House of Lords gave a wide scope to freedom of religion or belief, and Lord Nicholls 
recognised that ‘it is not for the court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge 
its “validity”’.139 Lord Walker agreed that ‘in matters of human rights the court should not show 
liberal tolerance only to tolerant liberals’.140 This is remarkable, considering the on-going 
discussion between the ‘compatibility’ of religion with human rights principles, especially at 
ECHR level. For example in Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v Turkey, the Court said 
this: 
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the Convention institutions have expressed the view that the principle of 
secularism is certainly one of the fundamental principles of the State which are 
in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human rights and democracy. 
An attitude which fails to respect that principle will not necessarily be accepted 
as being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy 
the protection of Article 9 of the Convention.141 
The same point was made in Şahin v Turkey,142 and the European Court has also stated, for 
example, that Sharia law is incompatible with democracy.143 In the view of Strasbourg, it appears 
that there is no tolerance for those who are intolerant, no freedom for those who do not 
respect the freedoms of others. The House of Lords differs from the position of Strasbourg, as it 
seems to advocate a more liberal and ‘tolerant’ approach to religious beliefs, an approach which 
is to be welcomed. 
 
The House of Lords simply accepted that the applicants were manifesting their beliefs when 
they authorised a child’s school to administer corporal punishment:144 
In the present case the essence of the parents’ beliefs is that, as part of their 
proper upbringing, when necessary children should be disciplined in a 
particular way at home and at school. It follows that when parents administer 
corporal punishment to their children in accordance with these beliefs they are 
manifesting these beliefs. Similarly, they are manifesting their beliefs when 
they authorise a child’s school to administer corporal punishment. Or, put 
more broadly, the claimant parents manifest their beliefs on corporal 
punishment when they place their children in a school where corporal 
punishment is practised. Article 9 is therefore engaged in the present case in 
respect of the claimant parents.145 
 
The House of Lords relied on the distinction established by the European Commission on Human 
Rights in Arrowsmith v UK.146 In this case the Commission set up an important test to distinguish 
a ‘practice’ which is a manifestation of a religion or belief (falling under the protection of Article 
9), from the broad range of actions which are merely motivated or inspired by them (not falling 
under the protection of Article 9). A direct link is needed between the belief and the action, and 
this has come to be interpreted as a ‘necessity test’. Strasbourg has been cautious in its 
approach, focusing on those elements of observance and ritual which are central to the lives of 
believers, rather than on activities that are motivated by the religious beliefs.147  
 
The House of Lords is more generous than Strasbourg and Lord Nicholls said: ‘I do not read the 
examples of acts of worship and devotion given by the European Commission *…+ as exhaustive 
of the scope of manifestation of a belief in practice’.148 This raises the question whether the 
distinction between manifestation and motivation is tenable. Shifting the discussion to the issue 
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of justification is to be welcomed because this is the real battleground with human rights and 
corporal punishment. 
 
The House of Lords then examined whether the restriction was justified under Article 9(2). After 
finding that the interference was prescribed by law, and was aimed at protecting children and 
promoting their wellbeing,149 it found that the restriction on parental rights was not 
disproportionate: 
the legislature was entitled to take the view that, overall and balancing the conflicting 
considerations, all corporal punishment of children at school is undesirable and 
unnecessary and that other, non-violent means of discipline are available and 
preferable. On this Parliament was entitled, if it saw fit, to lead and guide public opinion. 
Parliament was further entitled to take the view that a universal ban was the 
appropriate way to achieve the desired end. Parliament was entitled to decide that, 
contrary to the claimants’ submissions, a universal ban is preferable to a selective ban 
which exempts schools where the parents or teachers have an ideological belief in the 
efficacy and desirability of a mild degree of carefully-controlled corporal punishment *…+ 
Parliament was entitled to take this course because this issue is one of broad social 
policy. As such it is pre-eminently well suited for decision by Parliament.150 
 
Lord Nicholls adopted a classic human rights approach as he identified the conflict between 
parents and the State. He found that there was a large support in favour of the ban on corporal 
punishment, including parliamentary debate, a number of reports in England, and ECHR 
caselaw, therefore Parliament was entitled to legislate on the issue.  
 
Baroness Hale outlined the issue from the perspective of children’s rights and differed from the 
classic human rights approach adopted by Lord Nicholls. She said: 
This is, and has always been, a case about children, their rights and the rights of their 
parents and teachers. Yet there has been no-one here or in the courts below to speak 
on behalf of the children. No litigation friend has been appointed to consider the rights 
of the pupils involved separately from those of the adults. No non-governmental 
organisation, such as the Children’s Rights Alliance, has intervened to argue a case on 
behalf of children as a whole. The battle has been fought on ground selected by the 
adults. This has clouded and over-complicated what should have been a simple issue.151 
 
She argued that the essential question had always been ‘whether the legislation achieves a fair 
balance between the rights and freedoms of the parents and teachers and the rights, freedoms 
and interests, not only of their children, but also of any other children who might be affected by 
the persistence of corporal punishment in some schools’.152 Strasbourg has already 
acknowledged in Martins Casimiro and Cerveira Ferreira v Luxembourg,153 and Çiftçi v Turkey,154 
that when there is a conflict between the parents’ right to respect for their religious convictions 
and the child’s right to education, the interests of the child prevail.  
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Accordingly, with ‘such an array of international and professional support, it is quite impossible 
to say that Parliament was not entitled to limit the practice of corporal punishment in all schools 
in order to protect the rights and freedoms of all children’.155 There are problems with the 
approach adopted by Baroness Hale. Instead of being what she calls ‘a simple issue’, she makes 
it more complicated by re-characterising it as involving children’s rights. One could argue that 
Lord Nicholls’ approach is the simpler because it represents a straightforward claim between 
two competing views of the child’s best interests – the State and the parents. 
 
In comparison with the lengthy – and at times contradictory – judgments in the Court of Appeal, 
the relative brevity and the clarity of the speeches in the House of Lords are welcome. In 
particular, the Law Lords used the framework of Article 9 overtly and comprehensibly, paying 
careful attention to freedom of religion and belief. The House of Lords followed a classic human 
rights approach, and it is only at stage of the justification of the restriction that it found in 
favour of the State rather than the individual.  
 
Exhumation 
In English ecclesiastical law (applicable to the Church of England), there is a presumption against 
exhumation: the leading case Re Christ Church, Alsager156 provides a test founded on the 
principle that ‘there should be no disturbance of the remains save for good and proper reason’ 
and then elucidates when such a disturbance will be permitted.  This test was applied by the 
Consistory Court in Re Durrington Cemetery.157  The case concerned a practising Jew who had 
been buried, according to the rites of the Church of England, in a municipal cemetery in order to 
allow his widow to visit the grave.  However, several years after his death, the widow emigrated 
and the deceased’s Jewish relatives sought a faculty for the remains to be removed for 
reinterment in a Jewish cemetery in accordance with Jewish law.   Neither the widow nor the 
borough council objected to this.  Chancellor Hill granted the faculty.   Although there was a 
considerable delay between the original burial and the application,158 such delay was caused by 
the ‘dignified and principled restraint on the part of *the+ orthodox Jewish relatives out of 
respect for *the+ widow’.   Having decided the application in the affirmative, the Chancellor also 
thought it proper to make reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 and considered the impact of 
the ECHR as if the Act had been in force.159  Citing Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion), Chancellor Hill maintained that the Consistory Court ‘would be seriously at risk of 
acting unlawfully under the Human Rights Act 1998 were it to deny the freedom of the orthodox 
Jewish relatives… to manifest their religion in practice and observance by securing the 
reinterment of [the] cremated remains in a Jewish cemetery and in accordance with Jewish 
law’.160  
 
A few months later, after the Human Rights Act 1998 had come into force, the Consistory Court 
revisited this area in the case of Re Crawley Green Road Cemetery, Luton.161    The petitioner, the 
widow of the deceased, sought a faculty to exhume her husband’s ashes that had been buried 
following a humanist funeral in consecrated ground in a cemetery in Luton.  The petitioner had 
been unaware that the plot had ‘church associations’ and said that had she known this prior to 
                                                 
155 Williamson, paragraph 86. 
156 [1999] Fam 142. 
157 [2001] Fam 33. 
158 Which under the Alsager test is a persuasive justification for refusal of a faculty.  
159 The judgment was delivered on 5 June 2000; the Act came into force on 1 October 2000. 
160 [2001] Fam 33 at p 37. 
161 [2001] Fam 308. 
burial, the family would have regarded it as hypocritical and not proceeded.  She had 
subsequently moved to London and sought exhumation in order to inter the ashes closer to her 
new home.   She also contended that she had suffered from a long term depressive illness when 
making the original decisions.   Chancellor Bursell relied upon the petitioner’s ‘secondary 
motive’ that exhumation was required because burial in consecrated ground was hypocritical  
given her humanist beliefs, the Chancellor examined her Article 9 rights; and held that a refusal 
to grant a faculty would be incompatible with her right under Article 9 to remove the ashes from 
a location since Article 9 not only includes ‘the freedom of the act of thinking’ but also includes 
‘to some extent at least’ the ‘expression’ of one’s beliefs.162  
 
Although Article 9 protects the absolute right to hold a religion or belief, the right to manifest 
religion or belief is qualified.  It is limited in two ways: firstly, it is limited by the requirement in 
Article 9(1) that manifestation must be ‘in worship, teaching, practice and observance’; and 
secondly, it is limited by Article 9(2) which outlines the circumstances in which a State may limit 
the manifestation of religion or belief.   Even if there is prima facie an interference with the 
petitioner’s Article 9 right to manifest their religion or belief, that interference will not 
constitute a breach of Article 9 if that interference is justified under Article 9(2).  In short, the 
interference is justified if it is ‘prescribed by law’;163 if there is a legitimate aim;164 and if 
interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.165   
 
The recent decision in Dödsbo v Sweden in relation to exhumation illustrates how the 
Convention may not provide petitioners with the absolute rights supposed by Re Crawley Green 
Road.166 The applicant, the widow of the deceased, sought to move her husband’s urn from a 
burial plot in Fagersta to a family burial plot in Stockholm the city to which she had moved.   All 
her children agreed to the removal but the authorities denied the request under the Funeral Act 
1990, which, (doctrinally or otherwise) adopted a presumption in favour of ‘a peaceful rest’.  
Domestic appeals were rejected and the applicant herself died and was buried at Stockholm.  
The five children as sole heirs of the applicant pursued the application to the European Court of 
Human Rights invoking Article 8 (right to privacy and family life).    The Court by a 4:3 majority 
held that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.  
 
The majority held that it was undisputed that the refusal to allow the removal of the urn 
constituted an interference with the applicant’s private life.167   The Court did not question the 
Swedish Government’s submission that the interference was in accordance with law, the 
Funeral Act 1990.  The majority held that the interference has the legitimate aim of the 
‘prevention of disorder, for the protection of morals, and/or for the protection of the rights of 
others’ and that this was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ because ‘ensuring the sanctity of 
graves’ was ‘such an important and sensitive issue that the States should be afforded a wide 
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margin of appreciation’.168   The majority stressed that the Swedish authorities had balanced the 
relevant circumstances carefully acting within their margin of appreciation.169  
 
The minority agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under 
Article 8(1) but contended that this did constitute a breach of the Convention since it could not 
be justified under Article 8(2).  They said that the interference served no legitimate aim, 
reasoning that the removal of an urn from one sacred place to another sacred place would not 
jeopardize the principle of the sanctity of graves.  Furthermore, the interference was not 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ since ‘the applicant’s interest in moving the ashes of her 
spouse to the family grave in Stockholm weighs more heavily than the public interest invoked by 
the government’. 
 
Dödsbo v Sweden shows that although it is important to consider Convention rights,170 it is 
important not to read qualified rights as absolute provisions.  It is clear that even if refusing to 
grant an application to exhume and move a dead body breaches the applicant’s human rights, 
this does not mean that courts must reverse the presumption against exhumation to ensure 
that they are not in breach of the ECHR. 
 
Discrimination 
It may be said that the legislation of the last decade or so has resulted in a ‘new’ law on religion 
and a ‘new’ law on sexual orientation.171  There have been four important legal developments.  
First, the Human Rights Act 1998, in force from October 2000, ‘brought rights home’ by largely 
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into English law, including the Article 8 
right to respect for private and family life and the Article 9 right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.172  Second, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 created a new legally 
recognised human relationship based on sexual orientation that excluded religion: the law 
prohibited the use of a religious service during a civil partnership ceremony and stipulated that a 
civil partnership could not be registered on religious premises. Third, there were developments 
in criminal law: stirring up hatred on grounds of religion or belief and sexual orientation became 
specifically outlawed.173   Fourth, there were developments in discrimination law: discrimination 
on grounds of religion or belief and sexual orientation was expressly prohibited in England and 
Wales in relation to employment,174 and goods and services.175   
 
These developments are on-going. The Equality Act 2010 has recently consolidated the 
substantive law relating to religious and sexual orientation discrimination and the exceptions176 
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that exist for religious groups. And section 202 of the Act made provisions to remove the 
prohibition on registering civil partnerships on religious premises but this is not yet in force.  
Moreover, these legislative developments have led to a great deal of litigation concerning the 
ambit of these new laws and what should happen when provisions protecting sexual orientation 
clash with those protecting religion or belief.    
 
Collectively these developments constitute a significant shift from non-discrimination to anti-
discrimination, from passive tolerance to the active promotion of religious freedom and sexual 
autonomy as positive legal rights. The legal framework today is very different from ten years 
ago. The law now goes notably further than the ad hoc and piecemeal protection which existed 
in the twentieth century. In addition to ascertaining the effect upon religion, it may also be 
asked what impact this has had upon the right to discriminate: to what extent does English law 
allow religious groups and individuals to follow their own beliefs regarding human sexuality?177 
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